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Leviathanian Fiscal Competition in
Heterogeneous Country
1 Introduction
In many economic areas, including international trade, oligopoly, and public economics,
one compares outcomes of independent decisions of agents with possible results of their
co-ordinated policies. Often co-ordination can improve efficiency, accounting for spillover
effects (externalities) among decision makers. However, it may be harmful, when patterns
of co-ordination are restricted, or social efficiency differs from goals of decision makers (e.g.,
in oligopoly). It is exactly the case in the field to be studied here - in fiscal federalism, at
least when local governments are not completely benevolent, and unable to cooperate too
sophisticatedly.
The dilemma “competition vs. co-ordination” appears here
rather contradictory and this “constitutional choice” remains broadly debated in scientific
and political communities. On the presence of tax competition in Russia and discussion
around it one may see Kokovin and Kolomak (2000).1 Analogous examples of tax competition
within European Union, and the motives for its normative study, are brightly presented in
Edwards and Keen (1996).2 In this article (heavily relied on further, being referred to as
E&K), the dilemma to be studied is formulated as follows:
“Is international tax competition - or, by the same token, tax competition between lower-
level governments in a federal structure - a good thing or a bad thing? Or, to put the point
more precisely (and in the form that it would be addressed):
Starting from the non-cooperative equilibrium, would the representative citizen benefit
from, or be harmed by, some degree of international tax co-ordination?
Two widely divergent views [on this topic] dominate both the academic
literature and the policy debate.” (E&K, p.114, emphasis added.)
One view can be called anti-federalist or “politically left”, because it believes in benev-
olent state, being concerned with raising the government’s power through more tax revenue
(the theoretic development of this view originates from Oates [1972], it includes Zodrow
and Mieszkowski [1986], Oates and Schwab [1988], and others). It supposes that several
states may compete for mobile tax-payers by decreasing their local tax rates, like Bertranian
oligopolists do compete by prices.3 Surely, the states can better achieve their fiscal goals if
1The paper observes that inter-regional tax competition for capital in Russia in the form of regional tax
relieves and tax holidays became quite widespread during 1990-s, until forbidding the relieves by law in 2001.
2One of the episodes described in Edwards and Keen (1996) is when Sweden reduced capital income tax
to flat 30% in 1991, Norway followed the pattern with 28% in 1992, and Finland joined the race with 25%
in 1993!
3Some authors believe this competition to become sufficiently fierce in globalization process: “...fiscal
competition will wipe out redistributive taxes and reduce the tax system to one of mere benefit taxation.”
(Sinn, 1994). By the way, this citation stresses an important thing: mobile tax-payers try to fly away from
taxation only when it is to some extent redistributive.
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“internalizing externalities” by ceasing competition and cooperating, i.e., becoming a cartel.
It is exactly the aim of tax-co-ordination of regions (or just of centralized taxation) in this
leftist view, since governmental goals are identified as social ones.
Another view can be called federalist, or “politically right”, since it is anxious with
restricting inefficient redistributive activity of the states, who are supposed partially non-
benevolent or completely “Leviathanian”. Starting from famous Tiebout paper (1956), fol-
lowing Brennan and Buchanan (1977), and many others, this strand of thought argued that
fiscal competition based on tax-payer’s “voting by feet” may discipline non-benevolent local
governments to spend tax revenue only in tax-payers’ interests (“benefit taxation” ) and
to refrain from unneeded (for the taxpayer) taxes.4 It was shown in literature (see survey
by Wilson [1999] and more broad club/federalism theory in recent survey by S. Scotchmer
[2002]) that the competition may yield Pareto-efficiency independently of governments’ non-
benevolence. However, this requires some hardly-realistic conditions, including lump-sum
scheme of taxation, absolutely free mobility of tax-payers, and, most important, no need in
redistributive taxation (it is the rightist view on politics).
Edwards and Keen argue that “these two ... contrasting views clearly reflect profoundly
different perceptions of policy-making... <and> ... of government”, so their mere obser-
vation bears “... no clear guidance ... for the pressing issues of practical policy-making.
The central purpose of this (E&K) paper is to provide a framework within which these two
sharply contrasting views of tax competition can be articulated and compared. For both,
clearly, are extreme cases of a more general - and presumably more plausible - formulation
in which policy-makers attach some value both to the welfare of their citizens and to the
surplus that they are able to extract from the citizenry and put to their own uses.” 5
A synthesis of these two divergent views seems necessary. To perform it we
follow the approach suggested by E&K.6 They transform the dilemma ‘competition vs. co-
ordination’ from the realm of beliefs into a quantitative, i.e., an empirical question. That
means that fiscal federalism may be good for one country, but bad for another, or
good only for applying to a specific tax base, depending upon the economic situation.
In particular, E&K mainly speak of capital-income tax in Euro-Union, but in essence the
authors develop a universal intuitively meaningful measurable economic index, or criterion to
detect “local under-taxing”. Namely, “starting from the non-cooperative equilibrium, a small
multilateral increase in the tax on mobile capital increases the welfare of the representative
citizen if and only if the elasticity of tax base exceeds the policy-maker’s marginal propensity
to waste tax revenue” (regions are supposed identical the tax is the same everywhere).
Indeed, our intuition about these countervailing effects expect that the greater is “rivalry”
4E.g., British government once resisted idea of European tax coordination, since with competition “the
pressure on tax rates would be in general downwards, providing an essential antidote to the built-in pressures
for increased public expenditure and taxation.” (cited from E&K and UK Treasure, 1988). We shall further
interpret this upward pressure on taxation decisions as “populism”.
5In other words, from numerous papers we see, that contradictory views on competition efficiency arise,
naturally, from different assumptions. Federalist or rightist view supposes: 1) public goods, beneficial only for
taxpayers (i.e., benefit taxes), 2) rent-seeking government, 3) non-distortive (lump-sum) taxes. In contrast,
unitarian or leftist view assumes the opposite at all three positions. So, some synthetic approach like E&K
or the present one, is needed for moving forward in discussion.
6Besides, two other synthetic papers, combining countervailing effects into a unified framework are Keen
and Marchand [1997], and Sorensen [2000]. The first approach is not appropriate for our goals since concen-
trated on specific type of budget spendings. The second present a quantitative general-equilibrium computer
model with specific CES production functions and other particular hypotheses, also unsuitable for us.
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of the competing regions, the more arguments exist for co-ordination, while the greater is
“non-benevolence”, the more reasons we see for the opposite. In essence, E&K supports
this view by logic, and suggests a particular appropriate measures of rivalry and non-
benevolence.
The present setting extends E&K construction of empirical criterion of “good
or bad” tax competition, attempting to make it more detailed and practical. Modifications
include several aspects:
1) Partial-equilibrium representation of ‘feasible economy’.
Being concerned with corporate and capital-income taxes in Russian federation first of all,
we believe that it is practical to resolve our constitutional dilemma differently for different
economy sectors. Heterogeneity of economy in this dimension does matter. Say, it may
turn out useful to leave taxes on small business completely in the regional discretion, while
manufacturing of soft drinks, being very mobile across regions and very competitive, may
bring more national welfare under tax co-ordination or federal taxation. Specific treatment
is needed also for taxation of oil-and-gas industry with its huge natural rent and strong lobby
(by the way, there was a serious struggle between federal and local authorities for the right
to levy taxes on oil-and-gas).
These sector-separatation ideas motivate our step aside from the long tradition (including
E&K and everybody) of treating constitutional dilemma in general-equilibrium framework,
to a new model. E&K describe the whole economy by the unique neoclassical production
function, depending upon capital and labor inputs, and producing a single consumer good,
which may become public good as well. The unique representative consumer-citizen of
each region is at the same time the immobile employee, the mobile capital owner, and
the immobile consumer of private and public goods altogether. Such modelling simplifies
treatment, but shadows politically important considerations that we have in mind. Turning
to partial-equilibrium model of some sector or industry, we shadow instead the inter-sector
externalities and income-effect7 We believe that this inter-sector bias is less important, than
the contradiction between the rich (citizens and regions) and the poor, the main contradiction
to be addressed in resolving the dilemma.
In our model the economy, or the sector of economy to be taxed, has m regions, de-
scribed by m different regional demand functions for some commodity, or by tax-revenue
and welfare functions born by integrating these demands. (We speak of taxing some com-
modity at first, having in mind the most interesting particular commodity being capital.)
These demands depend upon the nation-wide price of the commodity and on m local taxes
(taxes can be simply added to the price like trade merges, or levied in more complex form).
Thereby inter-regional tax competition is similar to local-resellers competition.
Therefore, the sector’s potential productivity in any region is measured by potential
consumer surplus and taxes that it may generate. It is the demand curve’s integral minus
(linear) costs. Such monetary measure of utility is traditional for partial equilibrium models,
but needs some explanation here.
In our case, the most important and predominantly discussed application of the model
is taxing capital. Here the regional demand for capital is the “investment curve”, i.e., the
combination of all potential investment projects in the sector studied (see Section 1 and
7However, if applied to the whole economy, the particular version of our model turns out to be essentially
identical to the traditional model, so the possible income-effect bias lies not in the partial-equilibrium model
itself, but in its specific application.
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Appendix for details). “Consumer surplus” takes the form of entrepreneur’s profit or residual,
while the “pre-tax price” includes the interest rate payed by entrepreneur to capital owners.
It equals “cost” which is the value of alternative use of capital by its owners, say, when
applied abroad or in consumption. These owners (rentiers) are excluded from public welfare
calculation for the reasons discussed in Appendix, only residual claimants represent the goals
of business in this game.
2) Non-trivial inter-regional mobility of the tax-base and variable taxation schemes.
How harsh will be the tax competition? It depends upon the inter-regional capital
mobility (fluidity). We incorporate the assumption on the degree of mobility (fluidity) right
into the capital-demand function, making it dependent upon all taxes. Thus fluidity becomes
a specific exogenous parameter of economy, distinct from economy’s productivity. It makes
difference from the traditional approach. There ‘free’ apriory mobility of capital (free by legal
right) means only equalization of after-tax profits, while the shape of the production function
constituates smaller or larger observed aposteriory capital mobility (fluidity across regions),
i.e., some investment elasticity w.r.t. taxes. In contrast, here some sector or region may
have the same productivity profile as another one, but quite different aposteriory mobility
(fluidity) of capital.8 This ‘degree of substitutability’ of regions can not be modelled by the
traditional production function, while our approach captures it.
Besides, the real capital-fluidity pattern depends upon the scheme of taxation: is it
property tax, profit tax, VAT, or something else. Our model, unlike the traditional one,
is appropriate to study and compare any of these schemes, applied to the chosen sector or
economy.
3) Heterogeneous population: conflict of interests between rich and poor citizens.
In the traditional model, the unique “representative citizen” is the only player, who re-
flects social goals, opposing self-interest of the Leviathanian politicians. Instead we prefer
to describe citizens as two different groups of population: businessmen and labor owners
(typical households). It is much more realistic in Russia and in many other countries, so
the conflict between these two groups of interests is at least as much important in the story
about excessive taxation, as the conflict between the average citizen and Leviathan. Indeed,
our topic is first of all the redistributive taxation. In Russia it means mainly taxes on busi-
ness, when they are used for maintaining public goods for households. This process can
be called “milking” of business taxpayer, in contrast with “beneficiary taxation” situation.
Rightist political views (shared by the authors to some extent) look on such redistributional
practice with suspicion, supposing its inefficiency. This practice can be a simple consequence
of democratic process, dominated by majority of relatively poor households. They eagerly
“milk” corporations, since underestimating the related bad feedback to wages and emply-
ment. May be, as a result not only the “average” citizen is worse off, but even the poorest
part of population also looses, due to shrinking investment. I.e., political pressure towards
“milking” is suspected here to be just a product of political illusion of the median voter,
who do not realize the full consequences of her redistributive effort.
Nevertheless, it is not a scientific task to express our views on populism and corruption
in political economy. What we should do (and do) in our setting, is just to assume, that the
federal legislative body (constructing the federalist constitution) can have different degree
of populism than populism of regional authorities, competing with each other. This gap in
8Say, manufacturing of drinks is more regionally-mobile business than services, though the two may have
similar demand and cost curves.
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motives between the two levels is supposed in this paper as much important, as the gap
in their view on local corruption or unneded spendings, which is the main focus of E&K
(note, that even corrupted and populistic federal legislator may be against corruption and
populism at lower level!). As a result, the indicators of rivalry and non-benevolence should
account for this two-fold gap, irrespective of its nature and sign. In particular, our analysis
may help benevolent legislator to achieve her goals, but the same logic works for populistic
legislator as well.
4) Heterogeneous country: conflict of interests between rich and poor regions.
In contrast with tradition including E&K, we suppose a heterogeneous country, that
means different, non-identical regions. It is not only because it is the case in Russia, which
is our empirical field. The point is again in the conflict of interests, that may arise in any
country from its heterogeneity and should be touched in the politico-economic discussion of
federalism. Under heterogeneity, unlike the traditional homogeneous model, some regions
may show positive indicator of need in additional taxation, while other show negative indica-
tor. Theory must give an answer for this case: what is the socially-desired policy? It depends
upon hypotheses on “plausible” policies. Can all regions agree on raising tax rate in one
region and lowering tax rate in another at the same time? Can they agree on compensating
the related losses of some regions by some transfers from others? We look pessimistically in
both respects on the wisdom and sophistication of inter-regional political process, turning
here to the next item of our story.
5) Discrete change of political regime.
The basic traditional question of “under-taxing criterion”, which justifies local (infinites-
imally small) rise in tax rates, is only a step. We consider further a global jump from compe-
tition regime to co-ordination regime. Indeed, we hardly can believe that the co-ordination
activity of regions, once started, can stop on infinitesimally small changes (similarly, compe-
tition can not stop when started). More realistic is to expect, that after the constitutional
rules of the game start enabling cooperation, then the cooperation will evolve to full extent,
up to some new equilibrium in this new co-ordination-game.9
But what kind of cooperation-equilibrium can occur? When there are more than 3-5
regions, we do not believe in the concept of the core, due to high negotiation costs. We
assume instead some non-cooperative mechanism for reaching an agreement among regions.
One of such mechanisms to be considered is majority or “shifted-majority” voting for unified
tax rate (explained further), without any compensating transfers.10 It is the proxy for some
more complex political mechanism with majoritarian properties, seeming realistic in Russia.
The findings of the present paper 1) adjust E&K local “under-taxing criterion”
for our extended context, 2) use it to identify economic conditions, when global switch from
competition to co-ordination is welfare justified.
Section 2 introduces our new model and discusses assumptions.
9It is similar to curing a market-failure with the help of governmental regulation: theoretically correct is to
compare market-failure with the alternative government-failure, not with the ideal regulation or ‘small’ reg-
ulation. Exactly the same logic is used in the reverse situation: starting from coordinated taxes, is it socially
beneficial to legalize full-extent tax competition? “Small” (semi-)competition is hardly understandable.
10Though massive inter-budgetary transfers and political struggle for them exist in Russia, we take them
fixed in the game considered, to separate these complex issues.
7
In Section 3 the question of welfare comparison between competition and co-ordination
“in large” is decomposed into two sub-questions. 1) Are taxes globally lower in competition
than in co-ordination in certain sense? 2) Are they at the same time still “locally too high”,
in the sense that small tax reduction increases welfare? If both answers are positive, then
there is no need in “jumping” from competition to co-ordination. (This logic can be reversed
to estimate a shift from co-ordination to competition.)
Section 4 deals with the second question - local-shift analysis, to extend E&K criterion of
social gains from small additional taxation. Related economic indicators of regional ‘rivalry’
and ‘non-benevolence’ are developed to account for populism and heterogeneity, as well as
for corruption. Namely, if we observe small rivalry in tax-competition, jointly with big
populism and/or big corruption - then it is the signal that small tax stimulation is not
socially beneficial. If combined with tax-increase prognosis from Section 5.2, such diagnosis
definitely advices us not to undertake ‘big bang’ from competition to co-ordination: let
Leviathans compete rather than collude.11
Section 5 deals with the tax increase after switch to co-ordination (defined and discussed
in this section): will average tax rate really rise? The positive answer seems a common
wisdom, but it is really justidied only under additional assumptions like symmetric and
almost-symmetric (in certain sense) equilibria. Alternative assumption is ‘big’ mobility (we
show what it means), which bores famous ‘race to the bottom’. Some assumptions of this
kind are needed to escape ambiguity in reaction of heterogeneous economy to constitutional
changes.
Conclusion summarizes. Appendix contains some additional explanations, figures, and
examples.
2 New Model of Redistributive Tax Competition
As we have explained, our specific object of interest is “Leviathanian milking of business”.
(“Milking” means re-distributive taxation, like in Oatsian tradition: the state is taxing
business to finance public goods for households, unlike Tiebouvian tradition.) Trying to
formulate a “minimal” abstract model of this game, and still capture all important effects,
we came to the following partial-equilibrium setting. It modifies the traditional setting from
Zodrow & Miezhkovskii (1986) and, more closely, from E&K – by assuming no income effects
(supposing quasilinear utilities). Then it is convenient to replace production function and
preferences by demand functions, or by “tax base function” and “residual-welfare function”
in the same role. As we have explained, in this case tax base mobility (aposteriori fluidity)
appears to be a feature separate from economy’s productivity, that allows studying different
forms of taxation for the same country. Besides, we drop unneeded specific assumptions
on regional homogeneity etc. Our attempt is to make the model natural for the theory of
redistributive tax competition, and useful practically.
11Note that such arguments in favor of competition could be enforced if we considered also benefits from
public goods to business and related Tiebouvian forces. Thus our simplified treatment is sufficient to support
competition, but insufficient to reject it.
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2.1 Entrepreneur’s residual and tax revenue: what is the pie to
be splitted?
There are m regions or markets i = 1, ...,m each ruled by some authority named here
“governor” . Each governor i chooses a triple (ti, gi, li) ∈ R3+ subject to some constraints,
where ti ≥ 0 denotes tax rate, gi ≥ 0 is public expenditures for maintaining a public good,
li ≥ 0 is governor’s own luxury spending, or other unnecessary for the region, wasteful
governmental spending.
There is some activity, or commodity, or production factor traded in the country, and
optimizing taxation of this trade is our question. For definite interpretation, further this
factor is called capital (it is the most important factor for regional development, but the
model can be applied also to something else). A region i is characterized by two functions,
related to this good and its taxation.
Tax-revenue function Ti = Ti(t1, ..., tm) denotes the amount of taxes that can be col-
lected in region i. Note that it may be dependent upon all taxes of competing regions, and
presumably it should have maximum (Lafferian point) w.r.t. region’s own tax ti. In particu-
lar, the function may be constructed from some tax-base function Ki = Ki(t1, ..., tm) so that
Ti(t1, ..., tm) = tiKi(t1, ..., tm). It is mentioned just to note, that “tax base” is similar to
demand functions of monopolistic- competition model, taxes are like prices, and tax revenue
is like profit. A governor acts like a local monopolist on the demand side, at the same time
competing with other regions for supply (of capital).
Tax-payers’ residual-wealth function Vi = Vi(t1, ..., tm) plays the role of ‘consumer sur-
plus’; it denotes net monetary welfare of tax-payers (of corporations or entrepreneurs) in
region i, i.e., the residual remaining after paying interest (cost of capital, assumed con-
stant) and taxes. It does not include benefits from public goods maintained on these
taxes. (It should not be mixed with tax-payers’ “full” welfare or indirect-valuation function
V fulli (t) = Vi(t) + Ti(t), which is similar to the integral of demand for capital, i.e., total
possible net of interest gross profit, while Vi is net after-tax entrepreneur’s residual.) In par-
ticular cases (not always) both these elements of the model: tax revenue and residual wealth
- can be derived from one basic element like “tax base” or demand function, as explained in
Appendix. So, tax competition reminds “monopolistic competition” among “intermediaries”
(re-sellers). One of the departures is the following.
2.2 Legislator’s and governor’s objectives: what is (non-) benev-
olence?
What can be the local authority’s motives? We shall assume that the governor’s goals
do include, in one or another way, three different objectives: 1) welfare of business (with a
weight denoted β ≥ 0), 2) utility of households from public good (with weight γ ≥ 0), and
3) governor’s own “luxury” (with weight λ ≥ 0). For simplicity of exposition, we combine
them in separable objective function
Uβγλi (t, gi, li) = βiVi(t) + γiui(gi) + λiwi(li),
where, unless βi = 0, the weights may be normalized conveniently for our interpretation,
as βi = 1, so that all benefits be in dollars or roubles (so, further we often drop symbol
β.) An increasing function ui = ui(gi) (often further supposed the same for all regions)
denotes region’s utility from public spending. It is measured in monetary terms compatible
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with business gains Vi(t). It includes mainly households’ satisfaction, but some benefits
for business may be assumed also, unless it causes non-convexity of optimization programs.
“Satisfaction from waste” function wi = wi(li) similarly denotes governor’s satisfaction from
luxury spendings li. Budget constraint connects revenue with these spendings. More specif-
ically, the region’s income, splitted between the two goals, may include some fixed money
transfer (subsidy) si ∈ R from the federal sources (si < 0 means transfer from the region).
So, region’s budget constraint is
li = Ti(t) + si − gi.
Further, an important element of our reasoning is social welfare function. It must
reflect social planner ’s, i.e., federal legislator ’s objectives. We mean the agent who makes
the named constitutional choice in federalism: co-ordination or competition. She can differ
in ‘benevolence’ from regions. First of all, she may be unsatisfied with regional luxury. As to
her balance between business and households’ needs, we do not discuss, whether this balance
is close to ours, or to some ‘theoretical’. The question does not weight much, since we are
not the policy makers. Instead we just take legislator’s preference for a standard, to develop
advices for her.
So, crucial for the sequel is only the difference between governor’s goals and federal
legislator’s goals (β∗, γ∗, λ∗). For the legislator, it is natural to assume all weights of regional
business β∗ = βi∗ = βj∗ = 1, treating all local businessmen equally. Similarly, we can assume,
that all consumers of public goods are treated equally by the legislator, and their utility
ui(gi) from different levels gi of public good is normalized in terms of willingness-to pay for
it, so that social optimum must be achieved at point u˙i(gi) = 1 (dollar of marginal benefits
equals dollar of costs). Then benevolent weights can be supposed γi∗ = 1 = β∗. As to the
legislator’s attitude to luxury, we shall suppose her (not quite realistically) opposing luxury
on regional level completely: λ∗ = λi∗ = λj∗ = 0. Therefore we formulate the “benevolent”
whole-country’s objective function simply as
U benall (t, g, l) =
∑
i
[Vi(t) + ui(gi)].
Using this objective function, we do not seek for first-best social optimum, but compare
different non-optimal situations with each other in “social efficiency”. Mainly we compare
equilibrium and co-ordination solutions to each other. We mention also the maximum of
this “benevolent” function w.r.t. centralized taxes only (t1, ..., tm) (spendings g, l being op-
timized by regions afterwards). It may be called the “second-best” social optimum, while
“third-best” is similar maximum with additional constraint of uniform taxation: ti = ti ∀i, j.
But both these optima do not play important role in our discussion, since federal legislator
hardly have evident way to implement such policy, due to agency-problem and lack of infor-
mation about actual tax base. Instead we should compare practically admissible solutions
like equilibrium or co-ordination.
Let us further discuss the difference between local and federal goals, to motivate
our hypotheses.
‘Benevolence’ of local governments would mean, that regional administrations not only
hate luxury, but also choose the same balance as the central authority (β/γ = 1) in trade-
off between taxpayers’ (businessmen, mainly wealthy people) and public good consumers
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(households, mainly poor people). The latter may be not the case for at least two reasons
to be explained: 1) populism; 2) tax-exporting.
We argue that even a luxury-hating ‘honest’ government may behave as non-benelolent
“Leviathan” in respect of over-taxing, because of its specific position in the political game.
The name of “populism” we give to all situations, where local governments are pursuing
goals of their voters (mostly households) too-straightforwardly. Average household voter (at
least in Russia) is likely to underestimate negative consequences for him (in the long-run) of
too-high taxes on business. He sees only direct short-run benefits from ‘milking’ corporates.
(Who will vote against taxes on somebody else?) This tendency is further enforced by
tax-exporting motive: when sufficient part of capital owners are outsiders, then a region is
interested in maintaining own public goods on their expenses.12 Of course, populism could
be outweighed by lobbying activity of big business. But this pressure is hardly sufficient to
reduce taxes on average entrepreneur. Rather lobby seeks personal exemptions. This makes
us to believe in excessive populism of regions relatively to federal legislator in most countries,
and to discuss further this hypothesis more than the opposite.
2.3 Solution concept and assumptions: what is tax-competition
equilibrium?
Now we formulate the concept of the game among regions.
We assume that a governor maximizes the objective function Uβγλi (t, gi, li) subject to the
described budget constraint and to natural constraints on variables gi ≥ 0, li ≥ 0, ti ∈ [0, 1]
(here interval [0, 1] should be understood as normalized one, substituting some real legal or
natural bounds [t
¯
, tˆ] on taxes).
Definition 1 Subsidy values si given, (Oatsian) tax-competition equilibrium is a Nash equi-
librium (t¯, g¯, l¯) ∈ R3m+ in the game of regions, each region solving the program:13
Uβγλi ((ti, t¯−i), gi, li) → max
(ti,gi,li)
, s.t. gi ≥ 0, li ≥ 0, ti ∈ [0, 1],
Ti(ti, t¯−i) + si − li − gi = 0.
Such “competition regime” should be compared with some kind of regional “co-ordination”,
introduced below in special section.
To analyze competition equilibria we shall use throughout the following hypotheses, en-
suring solutions’ existence and their needed properties.
Assumption 1 All functions V, T, u, w are twice continuously differentiable, positive-
valued,14 functions u,w are increasing and strictly concave, u satisfies Inada’s condition
12We suppose, that populism pressure on federal legislator is weaker than on regional one. At least, on
federal level such complex question as constitutional choice has better chance to escape this pressure, than
question of tax rates, obviously being a money-splitting one. Another source of populism – tax-exporting –
is also weaker on federal level, concerning only foreigners.
13Comparing this definition with its specific realization in the above example of “distorting taxes” ,
one can note that governors here are supposed wise enough to predict influence of their taxes on capital-
equilibrium price p∗(t). It is not too realistic, but we suppose it making a little difference from “myopic
behavior” assumption in our context. Indeed, interest rate p∗(t) is hardly sensitive enough to a single tax,
to change the main results.
14This matters for comparative statics w.r.t. γ, λ.
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(u˙(0) = ∞, u˙(∞) = 0), Vi(t1, ..., tm) decreases w.r.t. ti, increases w.r.t. tj 6=i, being strictly
concave w.r.t. t. Function Ti(t1, ..., tm) is concave w.r.t. ti, increasing w.r.t. tj 6=i and
productive, i.e., for all tj 6=i there exists ti : Ti(t) > 0. Besides, we shall always suppose
transfers si strongly feasible in the sense: Ti(t) + si > 0 ∀t ∈ [0, 1]m.
Let us discuss the assumptions. The T positivity assumption, admitted for all taxes
t ∈ [0, 1]m ensure non-emptiness of interiority of admissible sets (regularity condition) for all
individual and collective optimization problems discussed further. It is a mild assumption
when interval [0, 1] is understood as normalized one, or/and this tax t is not the only source of
regional income. Together with functions (strict) concavity it ensures applicability of Kuhn-
Tacker theorem to get F.O.C. (first-order conditions), and uniqueness of individual solutions,
and applicability of Nash theorem to ensure existence of our equilibria (standardly).
The concavity assumption adopted is not quite innocent. In particular, when Ti(t) =
tiDi(t), Vi(t) = p0Di(t) +
∫ p0+ti
0
Di(τ), it restricts the shape of demand function Di. Still,
linear demands and many other demand functions, even non-concave, satisfy it.
Assumption 2 . The competition equilibrium solution t∗ lies below all Lafferian points
for all regions, i.e., ∂
∂ti
Ti(t
∗) > 0 ∀i .
This natural assumption on technology and preferences restricts also the solutions stud-
ied. It seems to follow from other assumptions, but clarifying it seems unimportant.
Assumption 3 . Welfare function U∗all(·) is concave.
In appendix we argue that under A1, the sufficient (far from necessary) condition yielding
A3 is the specific restriction on relative concavity of public-goods and luxury satisfaction
functions u,w. When one of them is “more quickly satiable” in certain sense, then
the demand for this commodity is concave. We say that for an agent with utility function
U(g, l) = u(g) + w(l), his demand for g is “more quickly satiable” than demand for l when
his response-function g∗(T ) to income T (under budget constraint) is concave. It is hard
to tell, is it a realistic assumption or not, to suppose governor’s demand for public goods
being “more quickly satiable” than demand for luxury, as we need. If both functions are
homogeneous of the same order, this holds.
On the other hand, concavity of welfare function can follow from other sources, even
when g∗(.) is not concave. The reason for assumption is that it is tightly connected with
uniqueness of equilibria and it is very hard to make welfare predictions ‘in-large’ without it.
Assumption 4 . Cross-derivatives of tax-revenue and residual functions have signs
T¨ ∗iik < 0, V¨iik < 0.
This assumption is used only in one section for comparing size of tax rates of coordination
and equilibrium and it is explained when used.
3 Logic of comparisons “in-small” and “in-large”: sep-
aration formula
Generally, constitutional choice in fiscal area arise from agency problem, that forces some
discretion power to be delegated downwards (in particular, we suppose regional productive
possibilities as well as ‘budget hunger’, populism and luxury unobservable from outside).
Unfortunately, we can not touch this choice too broadly here, due to our inability to di-
rectly model the informational structure of the real game between federal and local govern-
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ments, and informational costs preventing certain forms of centralization (including Pigou-
vian taxation or lump-sum taxation). Instead, we leave our assumptions about plausible
and implausible political mechanisms out of the model, and compare only several particular
constitutional solutions, often discussed or practiced: tax-competition equilibria and some
co-ordinated equilibria, defined later. Now we should speak of the whole class of various
co-ordinated equilibria, to convince that all can be compared somehow to competition.
Should we discuss co-ordination ‘in-small’ or ‘in-large’? We have mentioned that ‘infinitesimally-
small’ co-ordination of taxes (studied in E&K) is theoretically interesting, but hardly realis-
tic. More probable is that regions, after acquiring rights or ability to co-ordinate taxes, will
not stop on small changes. They can switch to completely new co-ordinated equilibrium. So,
constitutional choice should be looked upon as a global ‘switch’ from competition to some
other distinct regime, when comparing welfare.
Generally, under our assumptions such welfare comparison is ambiguous, since coun-
tervailing forces are involved (even the common-wisdom downward pressure of competition
upon taxes is sometimes questionable in heterogeneous country, as we show later on). How-
ever, there are certain cases with clear answers. Our goal now is to distinguish these cases
and to develop their indicators, answering the question:
What economic variables should we measure to decide, that switching from
a competition-equilibrium to some co-ordinated equilibrium (or vice versa) is
socially beneficial?
To answer the question, there can be a general approach (applicable to many types of
co-ordination regimes) that combines reasoning ‘in-small’ with global comparisons, as we
shall see now.
Indirect welfare function and “separation”
To compare welfare at any two states of economy, we can use marginal information at
one of them and linearize the estimated welfare function, exploiting concavity like in analysis
of monopoly (see Varian, 1985). 15 To accomplish this program,let us express economy’s
true welfare function U benall (t, g, l) =
∑
i[Vi(t)+ui(gi)] in terms of taxes only. It means taking
into account that region’s public expenses gi are optimized dependent on budget constraint
gi ≤ Ti − li + si together with luxury spending li. Moreover, gi = g∗i (Ti, γi, λi) must be
the solution to region’s spending problem under special assumption on budget revenue:
Ti = T
∗
i (t1, ..., tm). Then we can define an indirect welfare function
U∗all(t) =
∑
i
[Vi(t) + ui(g
∗
i (T
∗
i (t), γ, λ))].
This function takes into account impossibility to overcome regional non-benevolence of
spendings: choice between public goods and luxury is supposed out of central control. So,
its maximum can be called a second-best social optimum w.r.t. tax profile t = (t1, ..., tm).
(This second-best is expressed by the best point wˆ on the indifference-curves map of indirect
welfare function U∗all on Fig. 1.)
It can happen that competition-equilibrium coincides with the second-best
optimum wˆ. (Indeed, to build such an example, one can take any economy with benevolent
identical regions and start increasing all populism parameters γi = γj from 1 to ∞ simul-
taneously until optimality is achieved: g∗i = T
∗
i (t) = t
∗
iγDi(t). Under our assumptions, the
15As we have mentioned, it is not easy to make any predictions without some serious restriction like
concavity. Even with concavity, a lot of ambiguity remains.
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Figure 1: Welfare function U∗all(t1, t2), competition and co-ordination points in the case of
over-taxing.
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related comparative statics of the tax rate can be proved continuous, starting lower than
optimum, and finishing higher than it.) It is possible, since on one hand, competition ignores
externalities, but on the other - it hampers Leviathanian motives. These forces can exactly
outweigh each other in specific cases.
More generally, when competition is better than co-ordination? In terms of Fig. 1 the
question means: is the competition point t¯ situated higher than co-ordination point tˆ on the
hill, described by the map of welfare function U∗all(t1, t2)?
To compare any tax regime t¯ with an alternative regime tˆ, we can standardly use concavity
of our welfare function (concavity isAssumption 3 and our picture obeys it). By linearizing
U∗all(·) at t¯ (as described by dotted line), we build a loose estimate of welfare gains from
switching to alternative point tˆ in terms of derivatives (separation formula):
U∗all(tˆ)− U∗all(t¯) ≤ (tˆ− t¯)∇U∗all(t¯) = (τˆ − τ¯)
m∑
i=1
∂
∂ti
U∗all(t¯) . (1)
Here scalars τˆ := τU(tˆ), τ¯ := τU(t¯) are the ‘weighed average tax rates ’ at both regimes:
τU(t) :=
∑m
i=1 ξiti, where weights ξi =
∂
∂ti
U∗all(t¯)/
∑
i
∂
∂ti
U∗all(t¯) may be interpreted as indi-
vidual normalized “under-taxing indicators” (they can have positive or negative sign). The
scalar
∑
i
∂
∂ti
U∗all(t¯) is “aggregate under-taxing indicator” at point t¯. Negativity of the right-
hand side here (in particular occurring when each component (tˆi − t¯i)U˙∗all,i(t¯) is negative) is
sufficient for old regime (competition t¯) to be better than the new one. Therefore:
When the economy is overtaxed at initial regime t¯ in
the sense of separation inequality
(tˆ− t¯)∇U ∗all(t¯) = (τˆ − τ¯ )
∑m
i=1
∂
∂ti
U ∗all(t¯) < 0,
comparatively to an alternative regime tˆ, then switching
to the alternative regime would decrease social welfare.
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In essence, this formula enables to transfer ‘in-small’ (marginal) indicator of over-taxing
into ‘in-large’ (global) indicator. Moreover, unlike Edwards and Keen’s ‘in-small’ indicator,
arranged only for symmetrically-identical regions and symmetrically rising taxes, this formula
qualifies the whole set of directions of changes that bring decrease in welfare, for rather
general situations (the set is half-space above the dotted line).
Geometrically, in example on Fig. 1 black point t¯ = (t¯1, t¯2) denotes taxes at competition
equilibrium, while black point tˆ = (τˆ , τˆ) denotes specific uniform co-ordination, that lies
on the bisectrix. Point t¯sim = (τ¯ , τ¯) denotes the ξ− symmetrized equlibrium t¯, i.e., the
ξ−projection of t¯ onto the bisectrix, that uses normalized gradient ∇U components ξi as
weights (non-orthogonal projection). The (infinite) dotted projection-line t¯ t¯sim, orthogonal
to gradient ∇U, divides the plane into two half-planes. Our formula says that the whole
(right-upper) half-plane opposite to gradient ∇U is worse than t¯. It is only a sufficient, not
necessary condition: when co-ordination point is situated like point t˜, then it is incomparable
16This method of comparison is reversible, but with care. When seing average- undertaxing in some regime
and supposing average tax to decrease after turning to another one, the legislator also should not switch
regimes. But nothing can be said for the opposite direction of tax change: concavity do not allow two-side
estimates.
15
to t¯ within “separation inequality”, though being worse than t¯. On the other hand, the
picture shows, that simple non-weighted averaging of taxes could mislead our intuition.
Namely, competition t¯ can have simple-average tax rate lower than some new point tˇ (i.e.,∑
i t¯i <
∑
i tˇi), and “average over-taxing” diagnosis fulfilled (
∑
i
∂
∂ti
U∗all(t¯) < 0), but still
bring less welfare than point tˇ.
Thus with the help of the above assertion and its illustration we have divided the primary
question (when competition is better?) into two questions.
1) Are taxes in avarage (in weighed avarage) lower at competition than at co-ordination?
2) Are they at the same time still excessively high marginally (‘in small’), in the sense
that small tax reduction at competition increases welfare?
The below sections approach these two questions, starting from the second one.
Methodologically, note that in such comparison we are using only current local informa-
tion to predict consequences of global shifts in the tax space (t1, ..., tm). It seems to be the
only possible method. Global switching of regimes necessarily occurs blind, because it is
hardly possible to get reasonable information about quite different state of economy where
we have never been. Would-be elasticities and volumes of trade are unknown. That’s why
we build comparisons only on current information (on initial state).
4 Welfare comparison ‘in-small’: local criterion of under-
taxing
Let us focus on the assertion, which is a common wisdom in Oatsian tradition. It says that
non-regulated competition equilibrium is likely to have “too-low” taxes (lower than welfare
requires) since it ignores positive externalities among regions. Is it true under non-benevolent
governments?
Externality effect may be out-weighed by luxury-loving or by “populism”. So, generally,
“under-taxing” is as much possible at equilibrium, as “over-taxing”. How can we decide,
which tendency is stronger in current real situation? It is a quantitative empirical
question, to be discussed in this section. We attempt here to modify the method of
measuring under-taxing, suggested by E&K, for more broad environment, including non-
identical regions and populism.
Formally, measuring “under-taxing” means to estimate the gradient of welfare function
U∗all, or some its aggregate.
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To express marginal welfare increase in convenient terms, we study a very simple direction
of tax change: an ort ∆t = (0, ...,∆ti, ..., 0) > 0
m, i.e., i-th component of the gradient
∇U∗all. Economically it means to investigate the impact of some “small” tax stimulation
at competition equilibria, that achieves increase of only one tax.18 It means to study only
the “first reaction” to the increase in one tax, i.e., only ‘direct effects’ of the increase,
including flight of capital from the region taxed, changes of tax revenues and spendings
everywhere, but not changing taxes further towards a new equlibrium. So, only public goods
17In particular, E&K study special aggregate: impact of symmetric (∆ti = ∆tj) increase of taxes on U∗all,
that is reasonable in their similar-regions setting.
18We should focus now only on the welfare consequences of tax rise, not on how ∆ti is stimulated. For
instance, we can imagine an order from the federal body to rise one regional tax ti and to keep other taxes
unchanged.
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and luxury spending (g∗(T (t)), l∗(T (t))) will be adjusted to the new tax. Then, assuming
interior solutions (l, g > 0), the relevant increase in social welfare can be calculated from the
full differential of our function for tax shift ∆ti :
∆U∗all(t) = ∆ti ∗ ∂∂ti (
∑
j[Vj(t) + uj(g
∗
j (Tj(t)))] )|t=t¯ =
= ∆ti(
∑
j
[V˙ji(t¯) + u˙j(g¯j)g˙
∗
jT (T¯ )T˙ji(t¯)] ).
Here magnitude g˙∗iT (T ) is interpreted as the share of increase in regional budget, going
to expenditures on public good.
(This g˙∗iT (T ) can be expressed from spending-optimization problem as a solution’s charac-
teristic g˙∗iT (T ) :=
λiw¨ij(li)
λiw¨ij(li)+γiu¨ii(gi)
. Under our conditions, it satisfies relation 0 ≤ g˙∗iT (T ) ≤ 1.19
Besides g˙∗iT (T, γ, λ) = 0 when γ = 0 and g˙
∗
iT (T, γ, λ) = 1 when λ/γ = 0, (though in the case
of discontinuity of g˙∗iT (T, γ, λ) this does not imply g˙
∗
iT (T, γ, λ) → 1 when λ/γ → 0). Under
homogeneous objective function (γu(g)+λw(l)) or under weaker similar conditions, function
g˙∗iT monotonically decreases from 1 to 0 w.r.t. λ, and increases w.r.t. γ.)
Now take the competition-equilibrium’s first-order conditions:
V˙ii(t¯) = −γiu˙i(g¯i)T˙ii(t¯), Ti(t¯) + si − g¯i − li = 0,
(we suppose here l > 0, while another version (λ = 0, l = 0) is obtained as particular
cases of this one). Substituting them into ∆U∗all(t) we get
∆U∗all = ∆ti(
∑
j 6=i
[V˙ji(t¯) + u˙j(g¯j)g˙
∗
jT (T¯ )T˙ji(t¯)] +
+(g˙∗iT (T )− γi)u˙i(g¯i)T˙ii(t¯)).
Similar is formula for gradient
∇U∗all =
∑
j 6=i[V˙ji(t¯) + u˙j(g¯j)g˙
∗
jT (T¯ )T˙ji(t¯)] + (g˙
∗
iT (T )− γi)u˙i(g¯i)T˙ii(t¯)).
Its i-th component positivity is equivalent to∑
j 6=i[V˙ji(t¯) + u˙j(g¯j)g˙
∗
jT (T¯ )T˙ji(t¯)]
T˙ii(t¯)
> (γi − g˙∗iT (T ))u˙i(g¯i) .
If this relation is true, then some small tax-increasing stimulation is needed. This “under-
taxing criterion relation” that we discuss further can be reformulated in terms of new
notations L (“Leviathanian index” or “leftist index”) and R (“rivalry index”):
Li(γ, λ) := 1− g˙
∗
iT (T¯ )
γi
<
∂
∂ti
U ∗−i(t¯)
− ∂∂tiVi(t¯)
=: Ri(γ, λ), (2)
19Indeed, {γjuj(gj) + λjwj(lj)→ max s.t. gj + lj ≤ Tj} is, in essence, the consumer’s problem. Property
g˙∗jT (T ) > 0 is strict normality (of demand for g), and 0 ≤ g˙∗jT (T ) ≤ 1 says that l is not an inferior good,
moreover, an additional unit of income is spent on both commodities, when 0 < g˙∗jT (T ) < 1. Both non-strict
inequalities are guaranteed (strictness 0 < g˙∗jT (T ) - with Inada’s condition on u) for our separable objective
function γjuj(gj) + λjwj(lj).
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where ∂
∂ti
U∗−i(t¯) =
∑
j 6=i[V˙ji(t¯) + u˙j(g¯j)g˙
∗
jT T˙ji(t¯)]. In particular, g˙
∗
iT (T¯ ) = 1 in the case of
λ = 0 (no luxury-loving).
Thus we have obtained the assertion, which establishes local under - or over-taxing diag-
nosis for a region:
Starting from (Oatsian) tax-competition equilibrium,
a small increase of i -th tax (other taxes unchanged)
rises social welfare if and only if inter-regional rivalry
exceeds non-benevolence: Li(γ, λ) < Ri(γ, λ), and it deterio-
rates welfare in the opposite case: Li(γ, λ) > Ri(γ, λ).
What remains for local (over-) under-taxing is to add some rough considerations about
measuring rivalry and Leviathan indicators in competition situation.
4.1 Can we measure rivalry and non-benevolence?
Let us interpret the obtained ‘under-taxing criterion’ and compare it with E&K’s analogue,
reformulating it in measurable (?) terms.
1) The left-hand side of “under-taxing criterion”: Li = 1 − g˙
∗
iT
γi
is the “Leviathanian
index” or “corruption index”.
Recall, that here parameter γi > 0 is the region’s ‘degree of populism’, compared to federal
authority’s populism. For measuring γi we should tell, how the region would distribute
an occasional extra rouble between enhancing public goods and reducing tax burden, and
compare this ratio with federal legislator’s ratio. Say, if federal authority would spend it
1:1, while region i gives 2/3 to public goods and 1/3 to business, then its populism is
γi =
2
1
: 1
1
= 2.
May be, such variables can be meased econometrically. Another way is expert estimation
of γi through interviews. Say, federal legislator should tell us, does he/she suppose regions
excessively or insufficiently populistic (is γ > 1?), and to what extent. Vagueness of such
expert estimates do not undermine our logic, but rather questions the possibility of making
any legislative decision on theoretic grounds (anyway, one must know this ratio before the
constitutional choice).
Another parameter of Li to be estimated is g˙
∗
iT ≥ 0 which is the share of each additional
rouble of region’s budget that goes to public goods, in other words, it is the marginal share
of regional budget spent on household’s needs (not wasted for “luxury”). When discussing
γi we were dividing an extra rouble between households and businessmen. Now to estimate
g˙∗iT we discuss its division between households and corrupted governor, otherwise the idea
remains the same. Similar is Edwards and Keen’s “corruption” index C˙i which is connected
with ours in the simple form: g˙∗iT = 1−C˙i. This C˙ means “marginal government’s propensity
to waste tax revenue”. Like E&K, we hope, that experts in corruption studies can evaluate
somehow this ratio. The only difference of our index Li from E&K’s index C˙i of corrupt
behavior is that we allow for γi 6= 1 populism parameter.
For intuition of how g˙∗iT and γi interfere, let us observe polar cases of index Li. Obviously, Li
becomes zero when the region is completely benevolent: (γi, λi) = (1, 0) ⇒ g˙∗ = 1. So, some tax
stimulation is definitely needed under benevolent governments, when there is some rivalry:
0 < Ri(.). This specific result is the essence of typical Oatsian arguments against competition, since,
unlike our study, they do assume benevolence and ignore corruption.
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The opposite situation, Li = 1 happens when the region is totally corrupted (λi =∞⇒ g˙∗iT = 0)
or totally populistic (γi = ∞). In this polar case, and in intermediate cases, policy implications
depend upon the right-hand side of our inequality.
2) Now let us interpret the right-hand side of our criterion, Ri(.), which is “rivalry
index”.
It shows how seriously all regions do compete for i-th region’s tax base. To explain it
intuitively, suppose that we live in the first region: i = 1. Then we can express our rivalry
index R1 related to increase in our tax t1 as
R1 =
∑
j 6=1(V˙j1 + u˙g˙jT˙j1)
|V˙11|
≈ −V˙1move +
∑
j 6=1 u˙g˙jT˙j1
−V˙1close − V˙1stay − V˙1move
.
To comprehend these relations, note that here the numerator is our rivals’ marginal gains
U˙ benji (t¯) from the increase in our tax. The denominator is the marginal entrepreneurs’ losses
|− V˙ii(t¯)| in our region from this extra tax. They are splited into three parts: 1) nation-wide
losses |V˙1close|, resulting from ceasing business that becomes unprofitable; 2) some transfer of
welfare of enterprises remaining here into our regional tax revenue |V˙1stay|; 3) our local (intra-
regional) losses of profit of enterprises that escape new taxation by moving to other regions
|V˙1move|. These 3 types of business reaction to the tax rise we should be able to evaluate for
estimating index R. The first summand relates to immobile business, idiosyncratic to our
region and bringing almost zero net profit. The second one relates to profitable business,
not so much mobile as to react to this small tax increase. And the third one relates to very
mobile (in current situation) business, that feels almost no difference between staying with
us or going elsewhere, since being able to make almost the same net profit here and there.
That’s why we have substituted
∑
j 6=1 V˙j1 = −V˙1move; i.e., this part of our lost net profit is
a good estimate of our rival’s gains of entrepreneurial welfare.
Similarly we should estimate outside households ’ gains
∑
j 6=1 u˙g˙jT˙j from our tax shift. It
is convenient to divide everything by (∂T1/∂t1), it gives
R1 =
∂V1move/∂T1
−∂V1/∂T1 +
∑
j 6=1 u˙g˙j ∗ (∂Tj/∂T1)
MEB1 + 1
.
HereMEB1 := ∂Loss1/∂T1 = −1−∂V1/∂T1 denotes our regional Marginal Excess Burden
related to tax shift, due to moving or closing enterprises (the same logic applies when we
speak about decreasing potential investments, settling elsewhere or just ceasing, instead of
discussing existing enterprises). How can we predict the ratio (∂Tj/∂T1) related to the impact
of our tax revenue onto other regions’ revenue? When regions have more or less the same tax
rate, then it is reasonable to suppose that the same investment projects applied there make
almost the same tax revenue as here: (
∑
j 6=1 ∂Tj/∂T1) ≈ kmoveT1 := (∂T1move/∂T1), otherwise
we should multiply kmoveT1 by the relation of tax rates. To estimate ‘budget hunger’ variable∑
j 6=1 u˙g˙j = u˙g˙2 use equilibrium conditions u˙j(g¯j) = −V˙jj(t¯)/(γjT˙jj(t¯)) = (MEBj + 1)/γj.
Additionally suppose for simplicity that there is only one outside region (No 2), or all of
them are similar to No 2, then
R1 ≈ ∂V1move/∂T1−∂V1/∂T1 +
kmoveT g˙2 ∗ (MEB2 + 1)/γ2
1 +MEB1
≈ kmoveV 1 + kmoveT1 g˙2
γ2
∗ 1 +MEB2
1 +MEB1
.
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Here parameter kmoveV can be expressed and evaluated in terms of changes in regional net
profit after some tax shift as kmoveV 1 ≈ (∆V1move)/(∆V1all) = (V new1mov−V1move)/(V new1all −V1all),
or as the same proportion in percentage terms. Similarly kmoveT1 ≈ (∆T1move)/(∆T1). (There
is an example in Appendix 3 additionally illustrating calculations of this index R, and
showing that sometimes ∆T1move > ∆T1).
Summarizing, to measure rivalry we should be able to evaluate 1) benevolence (g˙2/γ2);
2) marginal excess burden, and its splitting into mobile and immobile parts; 3) loss of net
profit in the region due to additional tax and its splitting into mobile and immobile parts.
Under simplifying assumptions it is sufficient to know mobility of net-profit kmoveV (t) and
mobility of taxes kmoveT (t) (both may depend upon current situation t), plus benevolence.
One can compare the above formula with the index of rivalry from E&K: MEB
(1+MEB)
. Though
there is similarity, but the notionMEB have different meaning in their general-equilibrium context,
as well as capital mobility. Besides, the difference arise because E&K evaluate multilateral tax
increase, and do not allow for populism.
This discussion show that rivalry index R increases with tax-mobility ratio; with profit-
mobility ratio and with benevolence, becoming greater than 1 under sufficiently high
mobility (kmoveT > 1) and sufficiently benevolent governments, in this case L <
R. Then small tax increase is definitely welfare- justified in tax-competition
situation.
Thus we have repeated typical Oatsian result, expanding it at the same time to a vast
range of situations with rather high mobility and with reasonable corruption and polulism.
On the contrary, rivalry index decreases with non-benevolence (γ/g˙) and with immobility,
that discourages tax stimulation.
5 Co-ordination, welfare comparisons ‘in large’, and
heterogeneity
Now we turn to the main topic: using our ‘in-small’ welfare diagnosis for the global compar-
ison of federalism regimes.
5.1 What is co-ordination equilibrium?
What should be the realistic concept for “co-ordination” of regions? Should we assume
a cooperative solution, or non-cooperative one? We suppose the latter being more realistic
to consider. At least, for a large group (say, m > 3) a theorist should mention some non-
cooperative procedure converging to a cooperative solution suggested. What is the procedure
in reality?
We do not know exactly. There are some formal and informal political procedures.
Formally, in Russia regions make their propositions for the budgetary and legislative issues,
and vote for the budget, or for a bill on taxes, in the upper chamber of the parliament. Less
formally, any bill goes through parliamentary conciliatory committees and governmental
corridors, through ‘log-rolling’ and lobbying.
To model this game, we suppose some voting procedure to be a good proxy. Let us be
more specific. First, we doubt that sufficiently many regions (e.g., there are 89 regions in
Russia) can reach an agreement about individualized tax rates for all regions. Rather they
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can discuss uniform tax rate, one for all regions. Second, what kind of voting is a good proxy
for the real political battle? Sometimes it is realistic to suppose majority rule (it amounts to
median-vote under our assumptions, assuring single-peakness of preferences for a tax rate).
Instead we can suppose somewhat more general and realistic: ‘shifted-median’ or α-voting
procedure. Of course it is imaginary, being only a proxy for uneven bargaining power of
regions.
Definition 2 Procedure of shifted-median voting (or α-voting) means that all suggestions
(bids) ti of agents about scalar variable τ are ordered as t1 ≤ t2 ≤ ... ≤ tm and normalized
on the [0, 1] interval as: t1 → 0, t2 → 1/(m − 1), t3 → 2/(m − 1), ..., tm → 1. Then the
suggestion closest to the apriori given parameter α ∈ [0, 1] wins (in the case of the two closest
bids, one of them wins randomly). 20
In particular, α = 1/2 is the usual median-vote rule, reflecting equal rights or powers.
Another sample is when regions preferring smaller tax-rates (often it is rich regions) have
more bargaining power than others, that can be described by α < 1/2. (At least, rich regions
are powerful in Euro-Union and in Russia.)
The third important question of political mechanism is - how proceeds of taxes are
(re)distributed? We shall suppose here constant redistribution transfers, fixed once for all
times (that is equivalent to no redistribution in respect of stimuli). It obviously contradicts
the Russian reality, where we see large inter-budgetary transfers and subsidies changing in
time. However, we can not say anything distinct about this transfer-game, and restrict our
attention here on the game without fight for transfers (hopefully approximating the real
game). Under these assumptions we can formulate
Definition 3 Shifted-median voting rule α and subsidy values si given, voting-co-ordination
solution is the triple (τ¯ , g¯, l¯) ∈ R2m+1+ such that for each i, for given ti = τ¯ ∀i, vector (g¯i, l¯i)
solves the ‘spending problem’:
γiui(gi) + λiwi(li) → max
(gi,li)
, s.t.
gi + li = Ti(ti, ti, ..., ti) + si, gi ≥ 0, li ≥ 0.
At the same time, scalar τ¯ is the α−vote out of m votes (t1, ..., tm), each ti being the solution
to the ‘uniform tax-rate-bid problem’:
Ui = βiVi(ti) + γiui(g
∗
i (ti, γi, λi)) + λiwi(Ti(ti, ti, ..., ti) + si − g∗i (ti, γi, λi))→ max
ti∈[0,1]
,
where (g∗i (ti, γi, λi), l
∗
i (ti, γi, λi)) denotes the solution to the above spending problem (it is
the response-function).
We must note that here any α-voting co-ordination solution exists and describes in fact
a dominant-strategy equilibrium, not only Nash. Indeed, under our assumptions the profile
of preferences is single-peaked w.r.t. tax rate. Therefore, by the same logic as under me-
dian voting, Condorset paradox is excluded, the equilibrium exists, and sincere voting is a
dominant strategy.
20One can see that this procedure is not exactly the same as d-majority rule (see e.g. Enlow, 1997), and
that median-voting game can differ from majority voting in the absence of single-peakness.
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5.2 Externalities at work: does co-ordination really increase taxes?
Recall that our logic of constitutional choice requires to find which of the two compared
states of economy has higher average tax rate (in some sense). This paragraph, in essence,
performs almost-standard exercise in externality analysis, becoming not so evident under
our assumptions. The general idea is usual in ‘tax-competition’ analysis. Namely, when
choosing a tax rate, each region ignores positive externality on other regions, i.e., capital
flight from this region to its partners, induced by the tax. Therefore, common wisdom is
that there should be smaller taxes under competition, than under co-ordinated decision of
regions. However, let us see that in voting game this general tendency works not so easily,
or only under specific hypotheses. In some cases common wisdom can be wrong because our
(voting) ‘co-ordination solution’, unlike usual one, is a non-cooperative one, that matters in
heterogeneous country, as we shall see now.
Let us show that regional heterogeneity itself may make average tax rate at
co-ordination smaller than at competition. The idea is simple, and works even for
α = 1/2, that is median-voting rule. When externality effect is small or absent, then it is the
relation between median tax and average tax (among bids of all regions), that determines,
whether average taxes increase or decrease after fiscal regime switches from competition to
co-ordination. Say, among three players there can be one region choosing very high tax in
competition and two regions choosing very small tax rates. After switching to co-ordination
under absent externalities, the ‘small’ regions just force the only high-tax region to follow
the majority preferences, and average tax rate decreases (even the whole vector of tax rates
non-strictly decreases!). Weighed average tax-rate also decreases, when non-benevolence of
regions has the same sign, for example all three shows over-taxing ‘in-small’. Similarly,
some externality can be outweighed by an α-voting rule or other non-cooperative solution
in sufficiently heterogeneous country.
So, common wisdom about higher taxes at co-ordination is not guaranteed in our het-
erogeneous setting. Are there any general conditions on voting mechanism and on other
parameters sufficient for such ‘natural’ outcome? Now we only can formulate the two rather
special cases.
5.2.1 One case of tax rise: (almost) symmetric equilibria
One possible situation when co-ordination increase taxes, is some sort of symmetry of equi-
libria. It definitely happens not only when regions are identical (like in E&K and in many
other papers), but also in a broader class of cases. Indeed, some regions can be different in
many respects, but have similar taxes. It seems realistic, first of all, because competition
imposes strong symmetrizing forces. Besides, on other grounds, one region may have larger
populism, while the other have larger luxury-loving, resulting in the same ‘budget hunger’
and the same tax rate. Anyway, this assumption is much more plausible than uniformity
of all parameters, being as much useful, to make the common-wisdom prediction that we
deserve: more taxes at co-ordination.
At first glance the comparison is trivial. Like in textbook “cartel instability” story, all
agents must decrease prices (taxes) when becoming free of cooperative discipline. However,
our co-ordination solution is determined by the median voter or the α-voter only. Yes,
she tends to decrease tax rate after becoming free. But nothing particular can be said
about her partners, who did not participate in choosing the co-ordination point! Under
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high heterogeneity among regions it may happen that some regions increase taxes, and what
happens next, how it influences all others?
So, we need symmetry assumption and a mild additional assumption (Assumption 4) on
externality effect to escape ambiguity.
Now we start proving the named “common wisdom” with characterizing (symmetric)
co-ordination solution. Let us study i-th region’s objective function, when it chooses its vote
θ = θi ≥ 0 for tax level, and supposes itself to be a median voter or α-voter.
Take a region’s α-voting problem:
Ui = Vi(θ, ..., θ) + γiui(g
∗
i (T
∗
i (θ, ..., θ)) + λiwi(T
∗
i (θ, ..., θ)− g∗i (T ∗i (θ, ..., θ)))→ maxθ
Derive the co-ordination F.O.C. w.r.t. common tax rate θ :21 ∂
∂θ
[Vi(θ, ..., θ)+
+γiui(g
∗
i (T
∗
i (θ, ..., θ))+ λiwi(T
∗
i (θ, ..., θ)− g∗i (T ∗i (θ, ..., θ)))] = 0.
Use F.O.C. of spending problem to eleminate wi and obtain
∑
j V˙ij(θ, ..., θ)+
+γiu˙i
∑
j T˙
∗
ij(θ, ..., θ) = 0. Reformulating this for i-th summand we get
V˙ii(θ, ..., θ) + γiu˙iT˙
∗
ii(θ, ..., θ) = −[
∑
j 6=i V˙ij(θ, ..., θ) + γiu˙i
∑
j 6=i T˙
∗
ij(θ, ..., θ)].
We compare this to F.O.C. of competition:
V˙ii(τ, ..., τ) + γiT˙
∗
ii(τ, ..., τ)u˙i = 0.
To compare solutions θ and τ to these two equations, we are interested in monotonicity
of the left-hand side looked upon as a function φ:
φ(τ) := V˙ii(τ, ..., τ) + γiu˙i(g
∗
i (T
∗
i (τ, ..., τ))T˙
∗
ii(τ, ..., τ).
(We can not get monotonicity directly from concavity of region’s objective function used
in competition, since here we must include externalities. Similarly, we can not directly use
co-ordination’s second-order conditions.) We take derivative:
φ′(τ) =
∑
k V¨iik + γiu¨ig˙i(
∑
k T˙
∗
ik)T˙
∗
ii + γiu˙i(
∑
k T¨
∗
iik) = (V¨iii+
+γiu¨ig˙i(T˙
∗
ii)
2 + γiu˙iT¨
∗
iii) +
∑
k 6=i V¨iik + γiu¨ig˙i(
∑
k 6=i T˙
∗
ik)T˙
∗
ii + γiu˙i(
∑
k 6=i T¨
∗
iik)
The first summand here is the second derivative of competition problem, it must be
negative by concavity. The rest consist of cross-derivatives related to externalities. Economic
considerations enable to restrict their values with Assumption 4 (negative V¨iik). Indeed,
negativity of V¨iik = V¨iki means that when I am rising my tax, my marginal revenue from my
rival tax-rise decreases. It sounds plausible: the greater my tax - the less attractive is my
region. With similar reasons for T¨ ∗iik, we use Assumption 4 on cross-derivatives, and former
assumptions on u¨i, T˙
∗
ij, to get φ
′(τ) < 0, i.e., decreasing φ(τ). Using now
∑
j 6=i V˙ij(θ, ..., θ) +
γiu˙i
∑
j 6=i T˙ij(θ, ..., θ) > 0, we obtain finaly the needed estimate τ < θ.
Now, to slightly generalize our result, recall that we have assumed twice continuously
differentiable functions. So, we must believe in continuity of equilibria w.r.t. parameters.
This enables to say ‘almost’ in the following assertion obtained.
(Almost) symmetric tax-competition equilibrium
(t1, ..., tm) : ti ≈
∑
j tj/m = τ can not have higher taxes than
voting-co-ordination solution θ, i.e., τ ≤ θ, and in the
case of non-zero externalities it has strictly lower aver-
age tax rate: τ < θ.
21Here and everywhere, to bravely use F.O.C. we must be sure that the solution is not a
border one, i.e., taxes are positive. This follows from Inada’s condition of Assumption 1 when
all transfers si = 0. In more general case it is an additional assumption used throughout.
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Note once again, that we do not assume identical or similar regions here, only taxes are
assumed similar, that’s why it is a sufficiently broad generalization of “common wisdom”.
5.2.2 Another special case: race to the bottom
Together with symmetry, there is one more situation enabling clear comparison of compe-
tition and co-ordination in tax rates. It is the case of “race to the bottom”, i.e., severe
competition yielding (almost) zero taxes at equilibrium. What characteristics of tax-base
function provide such outcome?
It is interesting that neither “rivalry” of regions at equilibrium point, nor “mobility ratio”
index (explained above) take responsibility for this effect. Indeed, both these characteristics
relate to first derivatives of V, T , while Bertranian effects are due to very high second deriva-
tive of revenue V , i.e., the first derivative of demand. So, to describe conditions for “race to
the bottom” , we must somehow characterize this ‘temp’ of tax base mobility. What makes
competition really cut-throating?
Most evident example is the conventional “Bertrand’s competition” hypothesis.22 It says
that when a tax ti is higher than some other tax: ti > minj{tj}, then the related welfare
and tax base become zero: Vi(t) = 0, Ti(t) = 0, while both functions take positive values
when all regional taxes coincide [t1 = t2 = ... = tm ⇒ Vi(t) > 0, Ti(t) > 0 ∀i] . Besides,
there exists ε > 0, such that any (even infinitesimally small) tax reduction, started by a
region in profitable situation, brings it finite ε-increase of both functions. I.e. Ti(t) > 0 ⇒
[Ti(t1, ...ti − δ, ..) > Ti(t) + ε ∀δ > 0]. Obviously, this hypothesis contradicts continuity and
convexity of net-profit and tax-revenue functions, but we ignore this shortcoming here, since
equilibria existence follows from Bertranian hypothesis otherwise.
Under Bertranian hypothesis equilibrium exists and has zero taxes (it can be
proved standardly).
By the way, such equilibrium may be good for welfare, in contrast to common wisdom.
There is no clear arguments why zero-tax competition point must lie on lower indifference
curve than co-ordination point. We do not suppose the tax discussed here to be the only
budgetary source for our regions. There can be transfers and other sources. So it is not
clear why our households must necessarily milk this tax base for their needs. ‘Race to the
bottom’ may be good or bad, depending upon households’ and legislator’s preferences and
possibilities.
Only when at co-ordination equilibrium we had positive taxes and under-taxing diagnosis,
our logic enables to look on race to the bottom as definitely harmful.
6 Conclusions
We have followed the idea of Edwards and Keen, to look on federalist dilemma between
tax competition and tax co-ordination like on quantitative question: we should measure
some parameters of economy to decide, what is better for particular country. Our paper
22A weaker, much more reasonable hypothesis of the same kind studied in the Appendix is “great demand
elasticity” (“severe competition” ). It keeps demand continuity, being formulated in terms of infinitely high
derivatives, but also contradicts our assumptions on continuous derivatives and concavity, maintained in
other sections (so, it may also challenge equilibria existence). Quasi-Bertraian competition occurring under
this assumption turns out non-trivial: ‘race to the bottom’ is not guaranteed.
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attempts to make this measurement more practical, and extends this approach in several
aspects, important for federation like Russia: 1) regions may be supposed non-identical
(heterogeneous country); 2) taxation of particular industries or economy sectors can be
studied as well as taxation of the whole economy; 3) in addition to corruption, another
big source of non-benevolence - populism - was included into analysis; 4) big jump from
competition to co-ordination is discussed in addition to small or “gradual” regulation. For
this task we construct an appropriate model, which is a partial equilibrium model instead of
traditional general-equilibrium one.
The dilemma is studied in two stages. First, we decide, whether we observe or not local
(marginal) over-taxing at competition equilibrium. For this we must measure and compare
two local economic indices: “interregional rivalry” and “non-benevolence” (a method is sug-
gested to estimate them). If “rivalry” index is smaller than “non-benevolence” index, then it
is the sign of over-taxing in our economy, and taxation should be somewhat reduced, because
their difference measure marginal social welfare from additional taxation. If this difference
is in average negative among regions, and the weighed-average tax rate at competition is
less than tax rate at would-be co-ordination equilibrium, then “separation formula” shows
that there is no need in switching from competition to co-ordination.
Philosophically, the model shows how corruption, tax-exporting motives, and populism
can outweigh capital-flight impact on public welfare, and when fiscal federalism and its
specific form may be good or bad for certain country or economy sector.
It is shown what should we measure to make a diagnose.
7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix 1: deriving capital demand from investment projects
Let us explain how “regional demand for capital” and its “mobility” follow from initial data
on investment projects, and why our assumptions on demand function Di can be justified.
Regional investment projects comprise technologies for making profit and create
demand for capital. Treating “project” as economic agent (entrepreneur), we have in mind
somebody knowing the technology and eager to implement it with borrowed capital, or
with his/her own capital. Typical project is characterized by fixed total amount of required
investment and by its expected gross profitability which we define as revenue net of material
costs, federal taxes and wages (it is unusual to exclude federal taxes from “gross profit” but
it is convenient here). Inter-regional variations of profitability express a project’s mobility.
A project may yield the same gross profit in different regions (perfect mobility), or different
profits (limited mobility), or no profit in all but one region (absent mobility, idiosyncratic
project).
The table below with regions i = 1, 2, 3 and investment projects j = 1, 2, 3, 4 illustrates
this idea on imaginary sample. Complete immobility would result in diagonal matrix of gross
profitability [piji] (profit of j-th project in i-th region), while perfect mobility can be reflected
by a matrix with all columns [pii] coinciding. Only the 2-nd project is perfectly mobile here,
and only the 4-th project is immobile.
For analyzing the reaction of investment to taxes we need a compact exposition of the
projects data, i.e., the region’s demand-for-capital function Di(p0, t1, ..., tm), which is the
“response-function” of all the agents (projects) to interest rate p0 and to taxes ti. To con-
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Prj Invest- Expected gross/additional profitability (for p0 = 0)
No ment Region 1 (t1 = 0.00) Reg 2 (t2 = 0.01) Reg 3 (t3 = 0.05)
1 d1 = 10 pi11 = 0.40, a11 = −0.01 pi12 = 0.42, a12 = +0.01 pi13 = 0.30, −0.15
2 d2 = 20 pi21 = 0.15, a21 = +0.01 pi22 = 0.15, a22 = −0.01 pi23 = 0.15, −0.06
3 d3 = 30 pi31 = 0.20, a31 = +0.09 pi32 = 0.12, a32 = −0.09 pi33 = 0.13, −0.02
4 d4 = 40 pi41 = 0.11, a41 = +0.11 pi42 = 0.00, a42 = −0.12 pi43 = 0.00, −0.05
Table 1: Example of investment projects region-specific profitability.
struct this demand function from the projects data we suppose that the goal of an agent
named “investment project” is the net entrepreneurial residual (“net profitability”), which
is gross profitability net of taxes and interest rate (treated as fixed). For the case of prop-
erty tax (tax proportional to capital, or “unit tax”) we can express this profitability as
pji(t) := piji − ti − p0, while for least distortionary ad valorem taxation net profitability
is pji(t) := (1 − ti)(piji − p0).23 Any project chooses the best region, i.e., a region m(j, t)
which demonstrates maximal net profitability p∗j(t) := maxi pji(t) for this project, or, in
other words, maximal “additional profit” aji, relatively to the best other region in current
situation aji(t) := pji − maxs 6=i pjs(t). If p∗j ≥ p0 then the project can be fulfilled, and it
demands as much as dj investment from the capital market. To get regional capital demand
we just summarize these demands for all profitable projects choosing this region:24
Di(p0, t) =
∑
j:{p∗j (t)≥p0 & i=m(j,t)}
dj .
In other words, i-th capital demand or “investment curve” can be built (for fixed other
taxes) similarly to demand curve of any market where each consumer takes one unit. First,
order the “willingness to pay” or positive additional profitabilities of projects settled in our
region under zero our tax ti = 0: aj1i(0, t−i) ≥ aj2i(0, t−i) ≥ · · · ≥ 0. Second, represent each
project by a rectangle aji(0, t−i) × dj and stack these rectangles one onto another starting
from the most additionally-profitable at the bottom to the least profitable at the top. For
the the 1-st region of Table 1(7.1) it gives the curve of “taxable capital” K1taxable(t1) :=
D1(p0 = 0, t1 = 0, t2 = 0.01, t3 = 0.05) exhibited on Fig. 2 by solid line. Its inverse function
is a1(k) where k = 4, 3, 2 are names of the projects placed in proper order on ordinate. The
area of rectangles desribe maximal-possible tax revenue Tj1 from each project. In contrast,
“welfare of capital” mapping Kall(t) (dash line) we get when exhibiting gross profitability
pij(k) of all these projects on the abscissa, and area V21, V31, describe non-taxable welfare of
entrepreneurs, and their mobility. The upper graph of this figure contains the integrals of the
curves from the lower graph, to describe tax revenue T1(t) and entrepreneur’s residual V1(t)
in our region 1. For sufficiently many projects such capital curves should become smooth as
on Fig. 3).
Note that different taxation schemes (unit taxes like property tax, or ad valorem taxes
like profit tax) generate different demand functions D from the same projects’ information.
However, in any case the demand function should satisfy our assumptions: under any taxes
demand Di is bounded from above, decreasing w.r.t. own tax ti, and increasing w.r.t. other
23By the way, our model can be applied to the case when one region use property tax, while another uses
profit or any other tax. Only our statements about “coinciding” taxes will lose meaning.
24Here we suppose that maximum m(j) is unique, but the method can be generalized.
26
Figure 2: One region’s capital demand and welfare generated by 3 projects of Table 1.
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taxes. Besides, the amount of projects (or profit)
∑
j 6=1∆Dj(p0, t) moving to other regions
j 6= 1 after the increase in our tax ∆t1 is not greater than the amount of projects |∆D1(p0, t)|
gone away from our region 1.
7.2 Appendix 2: deriving welfare from capital demand
Tax revenue Ti(ti) and consumer surplus (entrepreneurial welfare Vi(ti)) can be derived
almost standardly from demand. However, when national-wide interest rate p0 = p0(t) is
not a constant w.r.t. all taxes (such variability is assumed in most tax-competition studies),
these notions need calculating capital-market equlibrium that becomes therefore a detail
of tax-competition equlibrium. In this case we should assume some capital-supply function
Supp(p0), non decreasing w.r.t. interest rate p0. Standardly, competitive interest rate function
p∗0(t) defined by equilibrium on capital market under taxes t is characterized by equation:
p∗0 : Supp(p
∗
0 ) =
m∑
i=1
Di (p
∗
0, t1 , ..., tm ).
This competitive-interest-rate function p∗0 = p
∗
0(t) , is well-defined and single-valued
when capital equilibrium exists and happens unique (that we shall assume). Therefore,
assuming intelligent enough governors to think of equilibria, we can substitute this market-
reaction function into the capital-demand function, and introduce the investment function
K depending only upon taxes as compound function
Ki(t1 , ..., tm) := Di(p
∗
0(t), t1 , ..., tm).
We often use simplified notation Ki := Di, dropping argument p
∗
0(t) after this explana-
tion, but we should explain why we eleminate p∗0 from calculating welfare. We everywhere
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exclude dividends of capital owners from calculations of regional welfare, performed by the
governors and by the “benevolent legislator”. One reason is that large part of investors can
be outsiders. Another reason is that most realistic is to consider the economy in question
“open”. It means that investors have enough opportunities to apply capital outside our
“economy” in other sectors, abroad or in consumption. Then capital supply is very elas-
tic and p∗0(t) appears almost constant, so any taxes that we apply make no difference for
investors’ welfare (but for the case of insider investors and small elasticity of Supp(.) our
calculation of welfare has some bias).
To derive welfare from capital, consider first the simplier case: property tax, that means
that tax-base is the amount of applied capital itself and tax revenue is defined as Ti(t) :=
tiDi(p
∗
0(t), t) = tiKi(t).
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Entrepreneurs’ monetary welfare remains of profit after taxation and paying interest
(which plays the role of costs), it is expressed like “consumer surplus” as in Appendix 1:
Vi(t) =
∫ Ki(t)
0
pii(κ)dκ− tiKi(t),
where κ takes values from the most additionally-profitable unit of capital to the least one,
and pi(.) denotes gross profit as a function of these values (see our figures and Appendix 1).
Similarly we can derive tax revenue and welfare also in the case of “least-distortive”
schemes of taxation. The least distortive method is taxing profit net of interest.26 It gives
Ti(t) := ti
∫ Ki(t)
0
pii(κ)dκ, Vi(t) := (1 − ti)
∫ Ki(t)
0
pii(κ)dκ. (Caution: as explained above,
capital function Ki(t) differ here from Ki(t) of distortionary taxation, though investment
projects are the same.)
7.3 Appendix 3: Example of rivalry index calculation
Example. Figure 3 illustrates capital demand, welfare and rivalry index for the case when
some region (regional index i = 1 is dropped on the picture and our rivals’ taxes are supposed
fixed) has 3 times more mobile enterprises than immobile, within each part of taxable demand
(thick solid curveKtaxmob), from the most profitable to the least profitable ones, so proportion
k
mob/imm
= 3/1 everywhere. The immobile capital is presented by the solid curve Kimmob on
the lower plot. We assume also that proportion in taxable/nontaxable profit of mobile
enterprises is everywhere 1/1 (for each unit), that can be seen from mobile profit (dashed)
curve Kallmob being 2 times righter that the taxable curve Ktaxmob (see Appendix 1 for
explanation). We assume taxation in the form of property-tax: T (t) = tK(t) . It means
that region’s tax revenue T = Tmobile+Timmob (two solid rectangulars) is proportional to the
tax rate t and to capital applied K.
25 Capital-income tax also may work similarly to property tax discussed here. In this case our
variable ti should not be understood as the tax itself, the model application should be adjusted.
26The same happens if we were able to apply discriminating lump-sum taxes, leaving each investment
project (see Appendix 1) with positive net entrepreneur’s revenue (with profit more than normal profit).
Then the country’s total tax base (total capital applied) could be independent of taxes! Lafferian tradeoff
disappears under taxation of rent. This scheme of taxation is absolutely ”non-distortive” only when all taxes
are the same. Indeed, the same project can bring more profit in one region, but may be forced by high tax
to move to another one, inducing welfare losses.
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Figure 3: Taxable and non-taxable, mobile and immobile demand for capital, and related
welfare indicators T, V for one region.
Now, let us realise what happens with welfare after a tax rise. Suppose that tax rate
in our region has rised from t to t + ε, as on the picture, and the related reduction in
mobile capital amounted to ∆K = −1 (so, immobile ∆Kimm = −1/3). Consequently
some part |∆Vtaxm + ∆Vimm| of taxable profit (mobile and immobile) is transfered from
entrepreneurs’ welfare into additional tax revenue. Yet, some tax revenue ∆Ltaxm +∆Limm
together with some profit ∆Lprof is transfered into our additional deadweight-loss, partially
(∆Ltaxm + ∆Lprof ) benefitting to other regions. We shall assume these quantities to be
∆Ltaxm = 2 = ∆Lnon−tax, ∆Vtaxm = −3, so ∆Limm = ∆Ltaxm/kmob/imm = 2/3, ∆Vimm = −1.
Then additional tax revenue is ∆T = εT˙ ≈ |∆Vtaxm| −∆Ltaxm + |∆Vimm| −∆Limm = 4/3.
At the same time, our additional deadweight-loss contains one more term ∆Lnon−tax =
|∆Vnon−tax| = |∆Vmove| = 2 connected with mobile profit that moves to other regions. It is
not a loss for the whole country, as well as ∆Ltaxm = ∆T2 = 2, in contrast with ∆Limm.
To illustrate the rivalry index resulting from our tax increase, we calculate ∆V = εV˙ ≈
−∆Vtaxm −∆Vimm −∆Lnon−tax = −3− 1− 2 = −6, ∆L = ∆Ltaxm +∆Lnon−tax +∆Limm =
2 + 2 + 2/3 = 14/3, MEB = ∆L/∆T = 14/4. Further, kmoveT = ∆Ltaxm/∆T = 3/2,
kmoveV = |∆Lnon−tax/∆V | = 1/3. Then, assuming our rival region No 2 having tax rate 2
times more than our’s, rivalry index can be expressed as
R1 =
∆Lnon−tax/∆T + 2 kmoveT u˙2g˙2
1 +MEB1
=
1
3
+
2
3
u˙2g˙2, or exploiting MEB1 =MEB2 as
R1 = kmoveV + 2 kmoveT
g˙2
γ2
=
1
3
+ 3
g˙2
γ2
.
So, one can calculate R1 using either our knowledge about ‘budget hunger’ u˙2g˙2 in our
rival region No 2, or knowledge about its marginal excess burden, populism and corruption,
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in addition to our named economic parameters.||
7.4 Appendix 4: concavity of indirect welfare function
Here we are going to derive the sufficient conditions for concavity of indirect welfare function
U∗all(t) =
∑
i[Vi(t) + ui(g
∗
i (T
∗
i (t), γ, λ))]. Concavity of V, T, concavity and monotonicity of
u was already supposed. Superposition of concave monotone functions enjoyes the needed
property, so one of possible sufficient conditions for concavity of the whole U∗all is the concav-
ity and monotonicity of g∗i (.). Recall, that this function is the argmaximum of the region’s
spending problem:
γiui(gi) + λiwi(li) → max
(gi,li)
, s.t.
gi + li = Ti(ti, ti, ..., ti) + si, gi ≥ 0, li ≥ 0.
This problem, in essence, is the standard consumer’s problem with separable utility
function, composed additively from two “satisfaction functions” u,w, that bore the demand
functions g∗i (.), l
∗
i (.) for the two commodities. The demand monotonicity in income T is
standard, while g∗i (.) concavity, as well as concavity of l
∗
i (.), depends upon relative charac-
teristics of satisfaction functions” u,w (we drop index i). When both are homothetic of the
same degree, then both demands are linear w.r.t. income T . When one of them is “more
quickly satiable” in some sense, then the demand for this commodity is concave. To see,
what this satiability means in terms of derivatives, differentiate the F.O.C., and reformulate
to get the first derivative of g in the form g˙∗iT (T ) :=
λiw¨(li)
λiw¨(li)+γiu¨(gi)
. Differentiating this once
again we get the necessary and sufficient condition for concavity of g∗i (T ) in the form:
γi
...
w(li)w¨(li) ≤ λi...u (gi)u¨(gi) or w˙(li)
...
w(li)
(w¨(li))2
≤ u˙(gi)
...
u (gi)
(u¨(li))2
,
(that can be monotonically related to the first derivative of the Pratt’s measure of func-
tions u,w.)
To see example where the concavity condition holds or not, take functions like u(x) = x1/2
and w(x) = x1/3. For small x ∈ (0, 1] , our inequality is violated, and g˙∗iT is convex, while for
sufficiently high arguments our g˙∗iT (.) becomes concave as we need, and demand with satisfaction
function u(x) = x1/2, becomes “more quickly satiable” than w(x) = x1/3.
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